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Hand-waving as renegotiation: The UK’s (and EU’s) limited
options
David Cameron has committed a future majority Conservative Government to a renegotiation of the terms of
British membership of the European Union, followed by an in/out referendum. While much has been made of
the political implications of a British exit, less attention has been paid to the substance of what a renegotiated
settlement might amount to. Dr Simon Usherwood of the University of Surrey argues that options for
meaningful ‘repatriations’ are limited, and that it is likely that any renegotiation will be more symbol than
substance. 
In the long history of  UK-EU
relations, the idea of  ‘f airness’
is one that has had a
prominent posit ion. Both in its
lay f orm – ‘it ’s not f air that we
have to do this’ – and its more
ref ined presentation as equity
– ‘we do not f eel that there is a
properly balanced relationship’
– the sense of  unf airness
characterises much of  Brit ish
debate on membership.
This is important to keep in
mind when looking at the
current debate about
renegotiation. Since David
Cameron’s much-trailed speech
in January, this has been the
Conservative party’s f ormal posit ion: to renegotiate terms of  membership and then to submit them to a
ref erendum. I’ve talked elsewhere about the second part of  this, so here I’d like to f ocus on the f irst part,
what it might include and what consequences it might have.
Renegotiation is, of  course, a cipher, in that what one might want to change or repatriate is a ref lection of
one’s view of  European integration and Britain’s role therein. This is most visible on the sceptic side of  the
debate, where the typical desire is to step back f rom more or less everything that isn’t about f ree trade,
and if  that doesn’t work, then leave the EU altogether and set up some new trading arrangement. The Tory
Fresh Start Group has gone down this line, with its extensive list of  what could and should be changed.
However, it would be hard f or a government of  any polit ical complexion to go into a renegotiation in a willy-
nilly f ashion, given the range and complexity of  what might be involved. For that reason, the on-going
Review of  the Balance of  Competences is a vital part of  the puzzle.
Started in July 2012, the Review per se is an audit of  what the EU does, a mapping exercise without
judgement. Its reports – which began this summer, continuing until late 2014 – provide a sense of  what the
situation is and how it works.
Naturally, those reports have been seized upon by all involved to highlight why their case is right, be that
pro- or anti-EU. Indeed, one might argue that this was the intention of  the Review, even if  the FCO has
been studious in standing back f rom any value judgments in its oversight of  the project.
Until that Review is concluded, it is dif f icult to know whether they will lead to a renegotiation package, but
we can already make some inf ormed guesses.
Firstly, despite some grumbles around the edges, those policy areas that have reported to date seem to
paint a picture of  a broadly appropriate balance of  competences. At one level, this should be no surprise:
the EU is a negotiated system, grounded in super-majority voting, so the general package is likely to be a
f air, but not perf ect, f it. At a second level, it also ref lects the scale of  socialisation and normalisation that
has taken place over the 40 years of  Brit ish membership: whatever the polit ical debate, ‘Europe’ is real and
present and has to be adjusted to and worked with.
Secondly, the Review has highlighted the deeply intertwined nature of  the wider international system. To
take one example, the health report noted that in many areas the EU is ef f ectively a local operating arm of
the World Health Organisation: even if  the UK withdrew f rom the f ormer, it would still be bound by the latter.
As such, any renegotiation would have to take account of  that wider system.
Thirdly, the Review should remind us of  the distinction between bureaucratic polit ics and public debate. As a
technical exercise, the latter does not really enter the equation. Theref ore, a government will f ind itself
having to manage a wide range of  interests and voices, all demanding dif f erent things.
Where does this lead? All of  this points to a very constrained set of  renegotiation points. Quite aside f rom
the Review, it is important to remember that the UK already has chosen not be part of  either the Eurozone
nor the Schengen zone, each of  which represent very substantial parts of  Union activity, and which would
have been logical places to f ocus attention.
What could be renegotiated can be split into the substantive and the symbolic. In the f ormer category would
be some generic (and non-UK specif ic) process f or limiting f urther integration and f or limiting the ef f ect of
policy decisions on states that have opted out of  that policy area. Here we might be talking about social
policy or justice and home af f airs, as well as f inancial services.
On the more symbolic side, there might be the Working Time Directive or the de-standardisation of
passport covers; the sorts of  things that might clear the hearts of  the Daily Express. In the public debate,
such things might have more impact, at relatively low cost. These might be the proverbial bones that are
thrown. Put together, none of  this is very substantial.
Notwithstanding the recent comments of  Angela Merkel on ref orm, it is clear that there is no scope f or a
wholesale ref orm of  the Union. The drawn-out process begun at Laeken in 2001 and only concluded with
the 2009 Lisbon Treaty only producing relatively minor changes in the end and no member state would wish
to repeat the experience f or the f oreseeable f uture.
What appetite f or ref orm that does exist rests mainly on Eurozone governance, in which the UK is
necessarily a marginal voice. Again, this suggests that the scope of  what might be possible will be less
rather than more.
David Phinnemore presented an interesting paper at UACES recently on how the EU might see
renegotiation. He noted that the Union has been very consistent in its dealings with non-member states,
which in turn are likely to limit what it will accept f or the UK. This includes preserving the integrity of  the
acquis and of  the institutional decision-making process, both of  which make a semi-membership option
potentially un-viable.
Of  course, much of  this will boil down to two key questions. Firstly, what will the UK ask f or? Secondly, how
much will other member states want to accommodate the UK? We have already talked about the f irst
question and the constraints on both supply and demand sides. On the latter, this will come down partly to
the state of  contemporary polit ical relationships with key players and partly on the degree of  self - interest
that states display.
David Cameron has perhaps belatedly to consider that a posit ive working relationship with counterparts
might be a good thing to do, but this is very much a work in progress. Moreover, it is hampered by states
wondering if  there is any value in getting close with the UK, if  it  is on a trajectory to exit.
Likewise, many states are having their own debates about changing the Union, and any Brit ish renegotiation
would become a general renegotiation, as everyone sought to get something out of  it. That tendency might
f urther incline those involved to keep things small and symbolic.
For those with long memories, we have been here bef ore with the 1974-5 Brit ish renegotiation. From a
position of  deep scepticism, that concluded with some concessions on f ood imports f rom the
Commonwealth and a limited package on f inancing.
Then, as now, it would not be unreasonable to conclude that any renegotiation (if  it  comes to that) will be
more symbolic than substantial – since it cannot practically be more than that under the current constraints
– and that more will be made of  it than it probably warrants.
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